> Whatever may be really “out there” cannot project itself as an affective experience. ... Nothing is either good or bad, desirable or undesirable, or anything else
Because the affective experience is composed of indifferent chemicals is exactly why it can serve as a neutral vehicle for all manner of things from good to bad. Language itself is neither of these but can express words intending a range from hatred to love, because language has no interests of its own towards either extreme. Neither do our emotions. Emotions are just honest. Because our feelings have no desires of their own, they are free to express all manner of experiences ranging from hunger, lust or injury, to pride, accomplishment, or awe. Whether or not there is something "out there" able to project itself makes no difference to the laboratory, which faithfully just colors our sensory experiences with feelings.
Yes and no. Yes, that "Nothing in the world is inherently compelling" and the emotions we associate with the world can be understood chemically and therefore mechanically. But I disagree that the "stranglehold of emotionalism... anchors [human existence] to hallucinations". We can have arbitrary emotional attachments-- these are visceral shorthands for unconscious memories of pain or pleasure which themselves formed arbitrarily-- and still find those emotions personally meaningful. They indicate hallucinations, sure, but they are *my* hallucinations. Acknowledging ownership of the arbitrariness isn't "inaccurate"; it's honest.
> Whatever may be really “out there” cannot project itself as an affective experience. ... Nothing is either good or bad, desirable or undesirable, or anything else
Because the affective experience is composed of indifferent chemicals is exactly why it can serve as a neutral vehicle for all manner of things from good to bad. Language itself is neither of these but can express words intending a range from hatred to love, because language has no interests of its own towards either extreme. Neither do our emotions. Emotions are just honest. Because our feelings have no desires of their own, they are free to express all manner of experiences ranging from hunger, lust or injury, to pride, accomplishment, or awe. Whether or not there is something "out there" able to project itself makes no difference to the laboratory, which faithfully just colors our sensory experiences with feelings.
So you agree with Ligotti is saying?
Yes and no. Yes, that "Nothing in the world is inherently compelling" and the emotions we associate with the world can be understood chemically and therefore mechanically. But I disagree that the "stranglehold of emotionalism... anchors [human existence] to hallucinations". We can have arbitrary emotional attachments-- these are visceral shorthands for unconscious memories of pain or pleasure which themselves formed arbitrarily-- and still find those emotions personally meaningful. They indicate hallucinations, sure, but they are *my* hallucinations. Acknowledging ownership of the arbitrariness isn't "inaccurate"; it's honest.